Improved Local Implementation under Central Inspection? Evidence from Social Mandates in China

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Improved Local Implementation under Central Inspection? Evidence from Social Mandates in China. / Ma, Yi.

I: Public Performance and Management Review, Bind 44, Nr. 4, 2021, s. 817-841.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Ma, Y 2021, 'Improved Local Implementation under Central Inspection? Evidence from Social Mandates in China', Public Performance and Management Review, bind 44, nr. 4, s. 817-841. https://doi.org/10.1080/15309576.2021.1905010

APA

Ma, Y. (2021). Improved Local Implementation under Central Inspection? Evidence from Social Mandates in China. Public Performance and Management Review, 44(4), 817-841. https://doi.org/10.1080/15309576.2021.1905010

Vancouver

Ma Y. Improved Local Implementation under Central Inspection? Evidence from Social Mandates in China. Public Performance and Management Review. 2021;44(4):817-841. https://doi.org/10.1080/15309576.2021.1905010

Author

Ma, Yi. / Improved Local Implementation under Central Inspection? Evidence from Social Mandates in China. I: Public Performance and Management Review. 2021 ; Bind 44, Nr. 4. s. 817-841.

Bibtex

@article{64ba92adf860467bbc14e3b920524dc9,
title = "Improved Local Implementation under Central Inspection? Evidence from Social Mandates in China",
abstract = "While the principal-agent problem has been challenging to public administration in general, it is particularly acute in China, where implementation gaps abound. This study examines whether central inspection, one important form of central monitoring in China, helps reduce implementation output gaps at the provincial level. Based on an analysis of a unique dataset of provincial governments{\textquoteright} documents formulated to implement central mandates in social policy areas from 2003 to 2017, it finds mixed results. While central inspection does help speed up provincial implementation outputs, it does not improve the quality of provincial implementation outputs.",
author = "Yi Ma",
year = "2021",
doi = "10.1080/15309576.2021.1905010",
language = "English",
volume = "44",
pages = "817--841",
journal = "Public Performance & Management Review",
issn = "1530-9576",
publisher = "Routledge",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Improved Local Implementation under Central Inspection? Evidence from Social Mandates in China

AU - Ma, Yi

PY - 2021

Y1 - 2021

N2 - While the principal-agent problem has been challenging to public administration in general, it is particularly acute in China, where implementation gaps abound. This study examines whether central inspection, one important form of central monitoring in China, helps reduce implementation output gaps at the provincial level. Based on an analysis of a unique dataset of provincial governments’ documents formulated to implement central mandates in social policy areas from 2003 to 2017, it finds mixed results. While central inspection does help speed up provincial implementation outputs, it does not improve the quality of provincial implementation outputs.

AB - While the principal-agent problem has been challenging to public administration in general, it is particularly acute in China, where implementation gaps abound. This study examines whether central inspection, one important form of central monitoring in China, helps reduce implementation output gaps at the provincial level. Based on an analysis of a unique dataset of provincial governments’ documents formulated to implement central mandates in social policy areas from 2003 to 2017, it finds mixed results. While central inspection does help speed up provincial implementation outputs, it does not improve the quality of provincial implementation outputs.

U2 - 10.1080/15309576.2021.1905010

DO - 10.1080/15309576.2021.1905010

M3 - Journal article

VL - 44

SP - 817

EP - 841

JO - Public Performance & Management Review

JF - Public Performance & Management Review

SN - 1530-9576

IS - 4

ER -

ID: 270282592